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Abstract
We consider how the outcome of bargaining varies with changes in the trade-off between equality,
efficiency, and total-earnings maximization. We observe that subjects avoid an equal-earning outcome
if it is Pareto inefficient; a large proportion of bargaining pairs avoids an equal and Pareto efficient
outcome in favor of one giving unequal and total-earnings maximizing payoffs, and this proportion
increases when unequal outcomes imply larger earnings to one of the players, even though this also
implies higher inequality; finally, we document a compromise effect that violates the independence
of irrelevant alternatives condition. (JEL: C70, C72, C92)
The welfare properties of equity and efficiency may determine the focal equilibrium
in any game, whether there is an arbitrator or not. (Myerson 1991, p. 373, italics in
original)
1. Introduction
Bargaining is ubiquitous in economic and social life. An employer negotiates with a
union about wages and working conditions. A buyer and seller negotiate over price,
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product specifications, delivery, and warranty terms. A couple negotiate over which
house to buy. Creditors negotiate over the division of the assets of a bankrupt company.
Which properties of an agreement make it attractive, or focal? In this paper we
present the findings from an empirical investigation related to Myerson’s conjecture
quoted previously, that a focal agreement possesses some combination of desirable
welfare properties, such as efficiency and equity. We consider three potentially salient
welfare properties: equality of money earnings, Pareto efficiency, and total-earnings
maximization. For simplicity, we refer to the latter as “total-earnings efficiency” and
to Pareto efficiency as “efficiency”.1
Suppose no agreement offers both equal and maximal total earnings. Then there is
a trade-off between these properties: if bargainers agree on equal earnings they must
accept a reduction in total earnings (perhaps even abandon efficiency); conversely, if
they agree to maximize total earnings, they must accept some earnings inequality. Our
central research questions are: how do bargainers tend to resolve this trade-off? And,
how does this resolution vary with changes in the terms of the trade-off? Suppose, for
example, that the feasible unequal agreements become more unequal but also offer
larger total earnings. Will this make bargainers more or less likely to agree on an equal-
earnings outcome? Although these questions seem both foundational and relevant to
real world bargaining situations, no systematic and general investigation has, as far as
we know, taken place.
To answer these questions, we design an experiment where pairs of subjects
negotiate over a given finite set of contracts. A contract specifies an amount of money
to each person within the pair. If the subjects can agree on a contract, each gets the
implied money; otherwise neither person gets any money. By collecting data for a
number of games that vary in the contracts and hence the efficiency-equality trade-off,
we can in a ceteris paribus manner assess how the focality of contracts depends on and
varies with properties such as earnings equality, efficiency, and total earnings.2 Our
approach differs from the typical bargaining experiment, where subjects negotiate over
a fixed sum of money, and where there is consequently no trade-off between equality
and total-earnings maximization.
In our experiment, subjects play several games and are rematched from round to
round. Even if we cannot entirely rule out repeated interaction effects, our matching
procedure makes them unlikely, and our results suggest they are, if anything, minimal
and not systematic.
1. We define these properties in terms of money amounts. Of course, Pareto efficiency in terms of
preferences does not necessarily coincide with Pareto efficiency in terms of money amounts, since subjects
may care about other subjects’ money earnings.
2. If transfers are allowed, players could achieve equality, efficiency, and total-earnings efficiency by
agreeing on actions that maximize the size of the “cake” and on transfers to equate earnings. In many
real-world situations, there are however constraints on the transfers that can be made. Suppose two siblings
inherit two indivisible objects, A and B. Both siblings prefer object A to object B. They are liquidity
constrained, so the sibling that gets A cannot compensate the sibling that got B. They may agree to get
one object each, or they may sell the items and divide the proceeds equally. Depending on how marketable
the items are, the proceeds from the sale may be quite low, and so the equal-earnings outcome may not be
total-earnings efficient, and may even fail to be efficient.
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We embed our contract setup in an unstructured bargaining protocol that allows
bargainers to make as many proposals as they wish within a certain period of time.3
They can communicate via chat, and any agreement is binding. The advantage of using
a free-form unstructured bargaining protocol, apart from its inherent realism, is that
it makes bargainers strategically equal (see the discussion in Ga¨chter and Riedl 2005;
Camerer et al. 2018), so our data on how the efficiency-equality trade-off influences
focality are not affected or confounded by some bargainers being in a strategically
inferior position.
Although our primary goal is empirical, it is useful to consider the predictions that
economic bargaining theory makes for how changes in the efficiency-equality trade-off
affect the bargaining outcome. We consider two well-known cooperative bargaining
theories (Thomson 1994), the Nash Bargaining Solution (Nash 1950, Chap. 35) and
the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution (Kalai and Smorodinsky 1975).4 As we show in what
follows, these bargaining solutions sometimes make different predictions about how
changes in the efficiency-equality trade-off affect the bargaining outcome.5
Our main findings are as follows. First, in the benchmark case where there is
an equal-earnings contract that is also total-earnings efficient, almost all bargainers
settle on it, as the findings from the existing bargaining literature would lead one to
expect. When the equal-earnings contract is efficient, but not total-earnings efficient,
the focality of the equal contract falls gradually as we lower its total earnings. In
some of our bargaining situations, more than half of bargaining pairs settle on an
unequal-earnings contract.
Second, we observe a strong tendency for bargainers to avoid the equal-earnings
contract when it is inefficient, regardless of what the unequal contracts offer.6
The third main result is based on a comparative statics exercise where we
exogenously increase the conflict of interest over the unequal contracts. This is done
by fixing the equal contract payoffs and raising the payoff that each unequal contract
offers to the player who gets his or her largest money earnings from it. The data show
that, when the equal-earnings contract is efficient, this results in a decrease (increase)
in the proportion of agreements on the equal (unequal) contract(s). This suggests that
bargainers are more occupied with maximizing their own, and possibly to some extent
the other person’s payoff, than with ensuring equality of earnings.
3. See, for example, Roth and Malouf (1979), Roth and Murnighan (1982), Anbarci and Feltovich (2013),
and Embrey et al. (2016).
4. In deriving predictions we assume as a natural benchmark that both bargainers are self-interested, but
we also allow for preference heterogeneity.
5. We emphasize that our primary purpose is to shed empirical light on the effects of changes in the
equality-efficiency trade-off rather than test these bargaining theories. Testing a theory about bargaining
would require measuring bargainers’ preferences and ensuring that these are common knowledge (see Roth
and Murnighan 1982; Roth 1995).
6. Recall that we measure Pareto efficiency in money terms, and our subjects may have additional
concerns other than the maximization of money earnings. Still, our finding that most subjects disregard an
equal and inefficient contract appears even stronger when allowing for this possibility.
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The fourth main finding concerns the observed cheap-talk communication. In
bargaining games with an equal but not total-earnings efficient allocation and two
unequal and total-earnings efficient allocations, many bargaining pairs create and
agree to use a randomization device, typically based on the rock-paper-scissors game,
to decide which unequal allocation they should agree on. Although informal and
nonbinding, the “recommendation” by this device is almost always followed by the
bargainers. Interestingly, in bargaining situations where there is a single unequal
contract alternative to an equal and efficient contract, rock-paper-scissors is almost
never used by subjects. Bargainers are thus willing to rely on randomization as a way
to break a “tie” between two symmetric contracts, but not to overcome conflict in
general.
The last main finding is that in most of the bargaining situations, and on average
across all situations, more bargaining pairs settle on an equal contract when there
are two unequal contracts rather than one. We interpret this as a violation of the
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) axiom (Nash 1950). This axiom, which
plays an important role in cooperative bargaining and social choice theory, states that
if a contract is agreed on when there is a large set of available contracts, then the
same contract (assuming it is still feasible) is selected when the set of alternative
contracts is reduced.7 As we explain in what follows, the violation happens because
a contract can be focal not only due to its absolute payoff properties, but also from
being a compromise between other feasible agreements.8 IIA fails to capture the latter,
contextual, source of focality, and in our data this effect is sufficiently strong to violate
IIA.
As far as we know, we are the first to empirically demonstrate a violation of the
IIA axiom in a bargaining environment. Nydegger and Owen (1975) experimentally
test IIA by comparing a basic situation in which two subjects must agree on how to
divide a dollar with a constrained situation in which player 1 cannot receive more than
60 cents whereas player 2 can still potentially receive the whole dollar. They observe
that subjects divide the dollar equally in both cases, consistent with IIA. However,
their experiment is a relatively weak test since there is a contract that is both equal
and total-earnings maximizing, which makes it strongly focal. Our experiment tests
IIA in a more demanding setting where no contract is both equal and maximizes total
earnings.9
As we describe in what follows, neither the Nash nor the Kalai–Smorodinsky
solution can capture all these empirical findings. Allowing for preference heterogeneity
improves the theories’ predictions, but the Nash bargaining solution (NBS) remains
7. A more formal statement of IIA is: suppose a contract x is feasible both when the set of feasible
contracts is S, and when it is T, where S  T. Then, if x is agreed on when the set is T, x is also agreed on
when the set is S.
8. See de Clippel and Eliaz (2012) for a theoretical analysis of an ordinal bargaining solution that
generates such a compromise effect.
9. Bone et al. (2014) also observe a tendency to compromise in their data. However, their experiment is
not a direct test of IIA since they do not compare larger choice sets with smaller ones.
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unable to capture the compromise-based source of focality of an equal earnings
agreement.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related
literature. In Section 3 we describe the experimental design and procedures. Section 4
outlines our hypotheses. The data are presented and analyzed in Section 5. Section 6
concludes. The Online Appendix contains experimental instructions and additional
analysis.
2. Related Literature
Existing empirical bargaining research (for surveys, see Roth 1995; Camerer 2003;
specific studies include Nydegger and Owen 1975; Roth et al. 1988; Herreiner and
Puppe 2010; Feltovich and Swierzbinski 2011; Karago¨zog˘lu and Riedl 2015; Camerer
et al. 2018) has done very little work on investigating how the bargaining outcome
varies with changes in the trade-offs between equality and efficiency. The reason is
simply that in these studies bargainers typically negotiate over a fixed sum of money.
An equal-earnings outcome is then also total-earnings efficient, which means that there
is no trade-off between equality and total-earnings maximization.10 The only studies
that we are aware of that vary the trade-off are Roth et al. (1988), Herreiner and Puppe
(2010), and Isoni et al. (2014).
Roth et al. (1988) consider binary lottery bargaining games where people bargain
over the division of one hundred lottery tickets, and where the number of lottery
tickets a player gets determines his or her probability of winning a personal money
prize. In terms of expected monetary payoffs, these games generate a linear Pareto
frontier with two potentially focal payoff pairs on it, namely an equal and efficient
pair (obtained by an unequal division of the lottery tickets) and an unequal pair that
offers larger total earnings (generated by an equal division of lottery tickets). Roth
et al. (1988) vary the slope of the Pareto frontier, and hence the efficiency-equality
trade-off, by simultaneously reducing the low prize and increasing the high prize. This
is observed to make the equal allocation less focal. However, this response can be due
to (i) the equal allocation being less focal due to its lower payoffs, and/or (ii) unequal
allocations becoming more focal due to higher total payouts. We think it is important
to disentangle these factors, and so we in a ceteris paribus fashion either (i) keep the
equal allocation fixed and vary the unequal alternative allocation(s), or (ii) keep the
unequal allocation(s) fixed and vary the equal allocation.
In the experiment by Herreiner and Puppe (2010) subjects negotiate for 10 min over
how to divide four indivisible objects. This gives rise to a nonlinear Pareto frontier,
and these differ across their games in a way that makes it difficult to attribute any
10. Note that if a contract is total-earnings efficient, it must also be efficient, but the converse is not
true. As a simple example, consider an equal contract offering (player 1, player 2) earnings (40,40). If
the only other feasible contract is (30,80), then (40,40) is total-earnings inefficient but still efficient. If the
alternative contract is (50,80), then the equal contract is both inefficient and total-earnings inefficient.
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observed behavioral difference to the presence or absence of some specific property
of the feasible payoffs or frontier. Our experiment varies the set of available contracts
more systematically, often by changing just one contract at a time. Another important
feature of Herreiner and Puppe’s design is that an equal and efficient contract is very
close to being total-earnings maximizing; thus their design does not allow one to
assess the focality of equal-earnings contracts that are efficient but far from being
total-earnings maximizing.
Isoni et al. (2014) consider unstructured bargaining situations where subjects claim
valuable assets placed on a “bargaining table”.11 Their design only allows for two
possibilities for the efficiency–equality trade-off: either an equal earnings contract is
inefficient or it is total-earnings efficient and hence efficient. The equality-efficiency
trade-off in their bargaining environment is thus either very severe, or there is no trade-
off at all. A key contribution of our paper is to also consider the arguably important
intermediate case, where an equal-earnings division is efficient but not total-earnings
efficient.
3. Experimental Design and Bargaining Games
3.1. Design and Procedures
The experiment was conducted at the experimental lab of the Centre for Behavioural
and Experimental Social Science, at the University of East Anglia (Norwich, United
Kingdom). We ran 7 sessions with 16 participants each, making a total of 112
subjects.12 The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree
(Fischbacher 2007); recruitment was done using ORSEE (Greiner 2015). Average
earnings (including a £4 show-up fee) were £16.15. No session lasted more than 1 h.
Subjects arrived to the lab and were allocated a desk. Instructions (see the
Online Appendix) were circulated and read aloud by the experimenter. Subjects were
informed that they would make decisions in 22 bargaining situations, referred to in
the instructions as “scenarios”. In each scenario they would be randomly matched
with another participant (stranger matching), and presented with a set of (two or
three) feasible contracts, displayed on subjects’ computer screen in a random order.
Each contract specified a number of points to each paired subject, such as (50,50) or
(40,240).13
11. In their environment not only payoff divisions but also spatial cues generated by the locations of the
assets on the table can be focal. These spatial cues are payoff-irrelevant, but can still be a source of focality
(see Schelling 1960; Mehta et al. 1994; Crawford et al. 2008; Isoni et al. 2013).
12. Background information on the participants is in the Online Appendix.
13. Using a small number of contracts allows us to vary the trade-off between efficiency and equality in
a simple and transparent manner that minimizes other confounding factors.
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FIGURE 1. Screenshot.
The two matched subjects were referred to as persons 1 and 2.14 A subject was
informed that he or she would in some scenarios be referred to as person 1, and in
others as person 2.15
In each scenario each pair of subjects had 120 s to negotiate over which contract to
agree on. During this time they could make contract proposals, and write messages to
each other. A subject made a contract proposal by clicking with their mouse on one of
the feasible contracts (see Figure 1 for a screenshot). As long as an agreement had not
been reached a subject was free to change his or her contract proposal, or to retract it
without replacing it with a new one, in real time and as frequently as desired. Subjects
could also decide not to make any proposals at all. A binding agreement was reached
if and only if the two players proposed (i.e., clicked on) the same contract.16 If the
subjects did not reach an agreement before the 120 s expired, neither earned any points
from the scenario.
14. The advantage of using labels for the two subjects is that it is easy to describe and refer to a contract,
and it is clear who gets how much. Moreover, each matched pair of subjects see the same representation of
contracts on the screens (and this is common information). The potential disadvantage is that labels may
have an effect on behavior. We did not find any differences between the two players in the data (see the
Online Appendix).
15. The alternative approach, that a subject was either person 1 or 2 in all scenarios, has the disadvantage
of reducing the number of possible matchings dramatically (a subject in the role of person 1 could only be
matched with those in the role of person 2), and hence a subject would more frequently be matched with
the same other participant.
16. The same agreement technology is used in other papers, such as Roth and Murnighan (1982) and
Feltovich and Swierzbinski (2011).
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The subjects could also write cheap-talk messages to each other while making
proposals. There were no constraints on the number and content of messages, except
that subjects were told to avoid writing messages that revealed their identity, that
physically threatened the other subject or that discussed what might or might not
happen outside the lab. Subjects were informed that, if it was detected that a participant
wrote any such messages, the subject would not receive any money earnings. Subjects
could make proposals without sending messages, and vice versa.
The 22 bargaining scenarios were not known to subjects in advance. Subjects were
informed that they would not be matched with the same participant in all the rounds,
and that different subjects would encounter the scenarios in a different order.17
Since different subjects encounter the scenarios in a different order, learning effects
in the data affect all scenarios to a similar extent and hence should not lead to systematic
aggregate effects that would bias comparisons across scenarios. Having subjects play
different scenarios against different coparticipants minimizes repeated-game effects,
since it is difficult to reward or punish a specific individual for his or her behavior in
past scenarios. One concern is that subjects could coordinate on a rule or heuristic for
the overall game, composed of the 22 scenarios. For example, subjects could use a
rule whereby in each scenario they select a total-earnings efficient outcome, to ensure
that the overall outcome will maximize total earnings. Alternatively, they could select
an equal-earnings outcome in all scenarios, to make sure that the overall outcome is
also equal. Our design does not rule out this possibility, and subjects did occasionally
mention such rules during bargaining, as we shall see from the coding data. However, if
such a rule was used consistently on a large scale, we would expect approximately the
same rate of agreement on an equal contract in all our 22 scenarios. In fact, behavior
varies in a systematic way across scenarios, suggesting that observed behavior is mostly
specific to the current scenario rather than reflecting some rule or heuristic that is being
applied to all of them.
When everyone had completed the 22 scenarios the computer randomly selected
three rounds for payment; the same three rounds were selected for all subjects in a
given session. The conversion rate from points to pounds was 20 points D £1.
3.2. The Bargaining Games
We refer to an unstructured bargaining situation with a given set of feasible contracts
as a bargaining game (called a scenario in the experiment). Each subject played 22
bargaining games, shown in Table 1. A visual depiction is given in Figure 2. The
numbers are measured in experimental points. As we explain in what follows, these
17. There were some unavoidable constraints on the matching protocol, due to the real-time nature of the
bargaining: if a participant plays a given scenario as, say, the seventh in his game sequence, then another
subject in the room must also be playing that scenario as her seventh scenario. The matching protocol
maximized the dispersion of matchings subject to these constraints (on average, subjects encountered the
same person 1.46 times). Details can be found in the Online Appendix, where we also find that the effects of
game sequence and past outcomes on current bargaining behavior are insignificant. The Online Appendix
also contains an analysis of individual behavior across the twenty two games.
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TABLE 1. The 22 bargaining games.
Game Feasible contracts Equal contract Equal contract
efficient? total-earnings efficient?
1 (80,80), (40,120), (120,40) Y Y
2 (70,70), (40,120), (120,40) Y N
3 (60,60), (40,120), (120,40) Y N
4 (50,50), (40,120), (120,40) Y N
5 (40,40), (40,120), (120,40) N N
6 (30,30), (40,120), (120,40) N N
7 (50,50), (40,70), (70,40) Y N
8 (50,50), (40,240), (240,40) Y N
9 (50,50), (60,70), (70,60) N N
10 (50,50), (60,120), (120,60) N N
11 (50,50), (60,240), (240,60) N N
12 (80,80), (40,120) Y Y
13 (70,70), (40,120) Y N
14 (60,60), (40,120) Y N
15 (50,50), (40,120) Y N
16 (40,40), (40,120) N N
17 (30,30), (40,120) N N
18 (50,50), (40,70) Y N
19 (50,50), (40,240) Y N
20 (50,50), (60,70) N N
21 (50,50), (60,120) N N
22 (50,50), (60,240) N N
Notes: Y D Yes; N D No.
games differ in the trade-off between equality and efficiency, and were selected to allow
us to test a number of hypotheses about this trade-off that are presented in Section 4.
Games 1–11 are of the form f(z, z), (w, y), (y, w)g, where 0 < z < y and 0 <
w < y. Since there are two alternatives to the equal contract, each of which offers
the largest money payoff to a different player, we call them two-sided games. Games
12–22 are of the form f(z, z), (w, y)g, and are one-sided games. Each two-sided game
has a corresponding one-sided game. We collected data for both types of games since
each seemed relevant for real world bargaining situations.18
When z  w, the equal-earnings contract (z, z) is inefficient. These are games
5–6, 9–11, and their corresponding one-sided versions 16–17, 20–22. When z > w,
the equal-earnings outcome is efficient. This applies to games 1–4, 7–8, 12–15, and
18. Suppose two siblings inherit a house. They can either sell the house and divide the proceeds equally,
or one of them can keep the house and pay the other a small (due to liquidity constraints) rent. If both
siblings live in the same city, the situation is naturally two sided. However, if one sibling lives abroad,
the situation is one sided: either they sell the house and split the proceeds equally, or the sibling that lives
locally keeps the house.
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FIGURE 2. Visual depiction of all games. One-sided games are represented by dotted circles.
18–19. If 2z  w C y, the equal contract is total-earnings efficient, and thus also
efficient. There are two such games, 1 and 12.19
4. Theory and Hypotheses
In this section we formulate hypotheses for how changes in the efficiency-equality
trade-off influence which contracts are agreed upon. Our bargaining environment
allows players to freely decide when to make a contract proposal, to communicate via
free chat, and to sign a binding agreement. Hence, we derive our hypotheses from the
predictions of cooperative bargaining solution concepts (see Thomson 1994, Chap.
35). Besides the NBS, which is the main solution concept for two-person bargaining
problems, we also derive predictions for the solution of Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975)
(KSS).20 We start from the benchmark assumption of self-interested bargainers with
utilities equal to own material payoffs (henceforth “selfish” bargainers), but we also
19. We only collected data for two games with an equal and total-earnings efficient contract, since we
anticipated that this contract would be strongly focal. The data confirmed this.
20. These solution concepts and their predictions are described in detail in the Online Appendix. The
NBS and the KSS have been defined for finite sets of contracts by Mariotti (1998) and Nagahisa and Tanaka
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/jeea/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/jeea/jvy030/5088947 by U
niversity of East Anglia user on 07 Septem
ber 2018
Galeotti, Montero, and Poulsen Efficiency versus Equality in Bargaining 11
state the predictions of these solution concepts for a heterogeneous population with
many different utility functions. For expositional reasons, we first derive hypotheses
for two-sided games and then compare these with one-sided games.
4.1. Two-Sided Games: Changes in the Total Earnings of the Equal
and Efficient Contract
In games 1–4 the payouts of the equal-earnings contract are gradually reduced, while
keeping the unequal contracts unchanged. The NBS predicts (one of) the contract(s)
with the highest Nash product. If utilities coincide with material payoffs, the Nash
product of a contract x D (x1, x2) is x1x2. Under the assumption of selfish preferences,
the NBS values efficiency (since increasing one player’s material payoff always leads to
a higher Nash product) and equality (since, for a fixed x1 C x2, allocations that are more
equal have a higher Nash product). Hence, an equal and total-earnings maximizing
contract is always predicted if present (as in game 1). The equal contract is still chosen
in game 2 since 70  70 > 40  120, but not in games 3 (since 60  60 < 40  120)
and 4. Although being equal and total-earnings maximizing guarantees that a contract
will be predicted by the NBS, being equal and Pareto efficient is not sufficient.
HYPOTHESIS 1 (Games 1–4, NBS with selfish preferences). The equal (unequal)
allocation is chosen in games 1 and 2 (3 and 4).
In contrast, the KSS selects the equal allocation in all four games. Intuitively, the
KSS attempts to bring both players as close as possible to their ideal allocation; none
of the two players should be making too large a concession. With selfish preferences,
this means that in all contract sets of the form f(z, z), (w, y), (y, w)g, where 0 < w <
z < y, the equal allocation is predicted.
HYPOTHESIS 2 (Games 1–4, KSS with selfish preferences). The equal allocation is
chosen in all four games.
An extensive experimental literature has found that agents care not only about
their own material payoff but also about the material payoffs of others. In particular,
agents may care about equality (see Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels
2000) or may care positively about the other player’s earnings (see Charness and Rabin
2002; Engelmann and Strobel 2004). Suppose we have a heterogeneous population
where some players are selfish, others are inequity averse, and others have social
welfare preferences.21For any given pair of bargainers, we can calculate the theoretical
(2002) respectively. Another important variant of the NBS, due to Conley and Wilkie (1996), is not defined
for finite sets of contracts.
21. More formally, u
i
.x/ D x
i
(selfish), ui(x) D xi  ˛i(max (xj  xi, 0))  ˇ i(max (xi  xj, 0))(inequity averse) and u
i
.x/ D .1  
i
/x
i
C 
i
x
j
for x
i
 x
j
; u
i
.x/ D .1  
i
/x
i
C 
i
x
j
for x
i
> x
j(social welfare) all have strictly positive probability. Moreover, within the inequity averse types, any (˛i,
ˇ i) with 0  ˇ i  ˛i, 0 < ˛i and ˇ i < 1 has strictly positive density. Within the social welfare types, any ( i,
i) such that 0 <  i  i < 1 and  i < 0.5 has strictly positive density. Even though we assume a continuum
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prediction of each solution concept (NBS and KSS) under the assumption of complete
information about preferences.22 Then both theories predict a gradual decrease (rather
than a sudden drop from 100% to 0%, or no drop at all as was the case with selfish
preferences) in the proportion of pairs that agree to the equal contract as its payoffs
decrease. For the NBS, some pairs would switch to an unequal contract after a small
drop in the earnings of the equal contract (this is the case if at least one of the players
has a sufficiently high  i), whereas others would stick to the equal contract even if its
total payoffs are low (this is the case if both players are sufficiently inequity averse). For
the KSS, an unequal contract can only be agreed on if at least one bargainer has social
welfare preferences.23 The drop in the predicted frequency of the equal contract is also
gradual for the KSS, with pairs where one or both players have sufficiently strong social
welfare preferences switching earlier, and pairs with weaker social welfare preferences
switching only when the payoffs of the equal allocation are very low.
HYPOTHESIS 3 (Two-sided games 1–4: NBS and KSS with a heterogeneous
population). Suppose the total payoffs offered by the equal contract decrease, while
remaining efficient. Then (i). Agreements on the equal contract become less likely. (ii).
Agreements on an unequal contract become more likely.
Note that (i) and (ii) do not follow logically from each other, since there could also
be a change in the frequency of disagreement (even though this is not predicted by the
theories).
4.2. Two-Sided Games: Changes in the Payoff to the Favored Player
in the Unequal Contracts
Consider next the effect of increasing the payoff to the favored player in the unequal
contracts (the payoff denoted y) while keeping an efficient equal-earnings contract
fixed (games 7–4–8). With selfish preferences, the NBS predicts an unequal allocation
in the three games we consider since 70  40 > 50  50, and increasing the payoff to
the favored player from 70 to 120 to 240 would only increase the Nash product of the
unequal allocations. On the other hand, it follows from our earlier discussion that the
KSS predicts the equal allocation in all three games.
HYPOTHESIS 4 (NBS, selfish preferences). An unequal allocation is chosen in games
7–4–8.
HYPOTHESIS 5 (KSS, selfish preferences). The equal allocation is chosen in games
7–4–8.
of possible types, a finite number of types would lead to the same comparative statics predictions provided
that the type space is sufficiently rich.
22. We view complete information as an “as if” simplifying assumption; our subjects can communicate
but they are unlikely to learn each other’s exact preferences.
23. Players who care positively about the other’s payoff would not be making as much of a concession
in agreeing to a disadvantageously unequal allocation, and may even rank the equal allocation last.
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/jeea/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/jeea/jvy030/5088947 by U
niversity of East Anglia user on 07 Septem
ber 2018
Galeotti, Montero, and Poulsen Efficiency versus Equality in Bargaining 13
Although the two theories make opposite predictions under selfish preferences,
once we allow for a heterogeneous population there is considerable consensus
between the theories as to the direction of the comparative statics predictions. In any
heterogeneous population (of the type described in footnote 21), the KSS predicts an
increasing frequency of agreements on an unequal allocation. This increase is entirely
driven by the presence of players with social welfare preferences.
The predictions of the NBS depend on the exact distribution of preferences (see
the Online Appendix). For example, in a heterogeneous population where all players
have either selfish or social welfare preferences, the frequency of the unequal allocation
increases gradually as we go from game 7 to 4 and then to 8. In contrast, in the presence
of inequity averse players the direction of the prediction is ambiguous. Sufficiently
inequity averse players always agree to the equal allocation when they meet each
other, and become more likely to agree to the (advantageously) unequal allocation
as y increases when they meet a player with selfish or social welfare preferences.
The ambiguity arises in pairs where both players are inequity averse, but not so
much that they would necessarily agree to the equal allocation. For these pairs, when
y increases, a contract that offers y becomes more attractive to the favored player,
but less attractive to the unfavored player, and the Nash product may increase or
decrease.
Since the KSS unambiguously predicts an increase in the frequency of the unequal
allocation in a heterogeneous population, whereas the NBS also predicts it in many
cases (including, but not limited to, the case where the proportion of inequity averse
players is sufficiently small),24 we take this prediction as our hypothesis.
HYPOTHESIS 6 (KSS with a heterogeneous population; NBS with a heterogeneous
population where most players have selfish or social welfare preferences). Suppose the
payoff to the favored player in the unequal contracts increases, while the equal and
efficient contract remains fixed. The proportion of agreements on an unequal (equal)
contract increases (falls) in games 7–4–8.
4.3. Two-Sided Games with Monetarily Inefficient Contracts
Next, we consider the games with an equal but monetarily inefficient contract. If players
are primarily concerned with maximizing their own earnings (or with maximizing
some weighted average of their own and the other subject’s earnings), both bargaining
24. Indeed, an increasing frequency in games 7–4–8 can occur even if all players are inequity averse.
As a simple example, suppose there are three types of players in the population, ranked by how inequity
averse they are. These are type H (˛ D 1, ˇ D 0.75), type M (˛ D 0.3, ˇ D 0.25 ) and type L (˛ D 0.05,
ˇ D 0). For y D 70, the only case in which an unequal allocation is chosen is if both players are of type L.
For y D 120 , an unequal allocation is chosen if one of the players is type L and the other is either L or M.
For y D 240, an unequal allocation is chosen if at least one of the players is of type L, irrespective of the
type of the other player.
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solutions predict that the equal contract would be avoided, since both players would
be better-off by agreeing to another contract.25
HYPOTHESIS 7 (Games 6 and 9–11; both theories with selfish or social welfare
preferences). No bargainers agree to a monetarily inefficient contract, regardless of
the properties of the alternative contracts.
The theories may still predict the equal contract if bargainers are sufficiently
inequity averse. By raising the payoff to the favored player in games 9–11, we are
making it increasingly challenging for Hypothesis 7 to hold.
4.4. Two-Versus One-Sided Games
From a theoretical point of view, the value of one-sided games is in the comparison
between one-sided games and two-sided games.26 Consider Nash’s IIA axiom (Nash
1950), which is one of the axioms satisfied by the NBS (an extension of this axiom
to multivalued solutions can be found in Mariotti 1998). Suppose that a contract x is
feasible in a game with contract set T and also in a game with contract set S, where S
is a subset of T. An implication of the axiom is that, if x is the unique solution when
the contract set is T, then x must also be the unique solution in the smaller set S. Let T
be a two-sided game with equal allocation x, and S the corresponding one-sided game
where x is still feasible. Then IIA predicts the following:27
HYPOTHESIS 8 (Independence of irrelevant alternatives). In the two-sided game, the
proportion of bargainers agreeing on the equal contract never exceeds the one for the
corresponding one-sided game.
The intuition is quite clear: if the equal contract was chosen over two other
alternative contracts, it should still be chosen over only one of them.28
25. We also have one game (game 5, with contracts (40,120), (40,40), (120,40)) in which the equal
allocation is only weakly inefficient. The NBS still rules out the equal contract in this case, but the KSS
allows it if both players are selfish.
26. In fact, under very general assumptions on preferences, the NBS and KSS coincide when there are
only two contracts. Denote the two contracts by x D (x1, x2) and x0 D .x01; x02/. Suppose each player prefers
a different contract (say, player 1 prefers x and player 2 prefers x0) and both contracts are preferred to
disagreement. Contract x is predicted by the KSS if player 2 would be making a smaller concession by
agreeing to x than player 1 would be making by agreeing to x0, that is if (normalizing the utilities of
disagreement to 0) u
2
.x/=u
2
.x0/  u
1
.x0/=u
1
.x/. The NBS predicts contract x if u1(x)u2(x)  u1(x0)u2(x0),
which is equivalent. The two solution concepts also agree in other cases, such as when both players prefer
the same contract (that contract is of course selected) or when one of the players prefers disagreement to
one of the contracts (the other contract is selected).
27. We ignore the knife-edge case in which the equal contract has the same Nash product as both or one
of the unequal contracts in T and the solution is multivalued. We expect these cases to be rare in our data,
unlike ties between the two unequal contracts.
28. Since subjects are rematched from round to round, we do not observe the same pairs bargaining over
the two sets of contracts, so we expect IIA to hold only in a probabilistic sense. Suppose IIA holds for
each possible pair in the population; then any pair that agrees on the equal allocation in a two-sided game
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An alternative to Hypothesis 8 is that the equal contract can be attractive not just
because of its inherent property of offering equal earnings, but also because it serves
as a compromise between two other rival contracts, as in the two-sided game. If this
compromise source of focality is sufficiently strong, the equal contract may be more
focal in the two- than in the one-sided game. This alternative hypothesis is consistent
with the KSS, since agreeing to the unequal allocation that favors the other player is
less of a concession if there is no favorable unequal allocation.29
5. Experimental Findings: Bargaining Outcomes
In analysing the data, we focus on the bargaining outcomes. Additional analysis (such
as of individual behavior) is reported in the Online Appendix. Table 2 shows descriptive
statistics for each of the 22 games (the Game column).30
The number of bargaining pairs that played each game is given in the Obs column.31
The table reports for each game the proportions of disagreements, agreements on the
equal contract, and agreements on an unequal contract (columns Rate of disagreement,
Rate of agreement on equality, and Rate of agreement on inequality). These proportions
sum to 100, and the rate of agreement equals 100—Rate of disagreement. See also
Figure 3 for a visual representation of the agreement proportions in the games (games
4 and 15 have deliberately been included twice, in order to ease comparisons).
Table 2 also shows the average time to agree for the pairs that did reach an agreement
(column Average time to agree),32 the average total earnings of a bargaining pair
(Average total-earnings efficiency, both in points and as a percentage of the maximum
achievable value), the number of proposals made per subject (Average number of
proposals), and the average number of messages sent per subject (Average number
of messages).33 Whenever we make pairwise comparisons of games, we use session
averages as the units of observation, in order to control for the non-independence of
would still agree on it in the corresponding one-sided game. Hence, equal allocations must be at least as
common in the one-sided game at the population level. The actual frequency of agreements on equality
may occasionally be lower in the one-sided game because we are looking at a sample rather than at all
pairs in the population, but it should not be systematically lower. If it is, IIA is violated.
29. Despite this intuition, the KSS does not necessarily predict a compromise effect in a heterogeneous
population. If player 1 has social welfare preferences and player 2 is inequity averse, they may agree on
(40,120) in the two-sided game (40,120), (50,50), (120,40) but agree on the equal contract in the one-sided
game (120,40), (50,50).
30. We do not find any statistically significant effects of subject labels (1 or 2) on behavior. Similarly,
the way in which a given set of contracts was ordered on the screen has no effect. Details are in the Online
Appendix. We therefore pool all data.
31. A technical problem at the end of one of our sessions resulted in the loss of some data; as a result we
have a different number of observations for some games.
32. The Online Appendix gives more details on agreement times.
33. We also looked at the number of characters in the text instead of the number of messages sent. The
results are qualitatively identical and are available from the authors upon request. We thank Nick Feltovich
for suggesting this analysis.
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FIGURE 3. Proportion of different bargaining outcomes for each game.
the observations at the individual level. All statistical tests are two-tailed, and, unless
otherwise mentioned, significance refers to the 5% level.
We start by considering efficiency across the games. The rate of disagreement
is in general quite low (the average is below 6%). In several games there are no
disagreements at all, and the rate of disagreement never exceeds 15%.
In spite of the generally high rate of agreement, there are some noteworthy
differences between the games. In two-sided games the rate of agreement tends to
decrease as the equal contract becomes less efficient (games 1–6) (Page’s trend test,
p D 0.014). The agreement rate also decreases when, keeping the equal contract fixed,
we make the unequal contract(s) more unequal. When the equal contract is efficient
(games 7, 4, and 8), increasing the amount y offered in the contracts (40, y) and (y, 40)
results in an increasing rate of disagreement (Page’s trend test, p D 0.054). Something
similar happens in games 9–11, where the equal contract is inefficient (Page’s trend
test, p D 0.041). Interestingly, there is no significant pattern in one-sided games.
We summarize these findings as follows.
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FINDING 1. In two-sided games, the rate of agreement tends to fall as the equal
contract offers lower total earnings and eventually ceases to be efficient. The rate of
agreement also tends to fall when the unequal contracts become more unequal. No
significant pattern is found in one-sided games.
Since disagreement is ruled out by both the NBS and the KSS, these findings
are not predicted by the theory. An intuitive explanation is that the equal contract
becomes less attractive when its total payouts drop (in the language of the NBS, its
Nash product decreases; in the language of the KSS, bargainers would be making a
greater concession by agreeing to it). Since in two-sided games there are two unequal
contracts, each of which favors a different player, subjects may bargain harder for the
unequal allocation that favors them and this makes it more difficult to agree.
In one-sided games there is only one unequal allocation, so that reducing the
payoffs of the equal contract does not necessarily make it harder to agree (in fact,
conflict disappears if payoffs drop so much that the equal contract becomes inefficient).
Similarly, making the unequal contracts more unequal increases the conflict of interest
in two-sided games. In one-sided games, the conflict of interest is less pronounced since
there is only one unequal allocation; indeed, if players have social welfare preferences,
increasing the payoff to the favored player would reduce the conflict of interest in
one-sided games but not in two-sided games. Thus, the increase in disagreements for
two-sided games appears to be the result of chicken-type bargaining involving the two
unequal contracts.
5.1. Changes in the Total Payoff Efficiency of the Equal Contract
In games 1–4 more pairs settle on an equal and efficient contract than on an unequal
and total-earnings maximizing contract. As we lower the total payouts of the equal
contract while keeping the payoffs of the unequal contracts fixed, there is a monotonic
and statistically significant drop in the rate of agreement on the equal contract (Page’s
trend test, p < 0.001).34
FINDING 2 (Hypotheses 1–3). In games 1–4, almost all bargaining pairs agree on the
equal contract when it is total-earnings efficient. The proportion of agreements on the
equal contract falls gradually as its total payouts decrease, but a majority of agreements
remain on the equal contract as long as it remains efficient.
Finding 2 shows that the focality of an equal and efficient contract decreases only
gradually as its total earnings are lowered; if an equal and efficient contract ceases
being total-earnings efficient, there is no sharp decline in its focality. Hence, total-
earnings efficiency is a sufficient, but not a necessary condition for subjects to accept
34. In pairwise comparisons based on a Wilcoxon signed-rank test, at the 5% level of significance, the
relationship between the rates of agreement on equality for two-sided games is: game 1 D game 2 >
game 3 > game 4.
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an equal agreement. On the other hand, the equal allocation being efficient does not
prevent a substantial proportion of bargainers from settling on an unequal allocation.35
The findings on games 1–4 are not consistent with the KSS for selfish preferences,
since it predicts the equal contract in all games (cf. Hypothesis 2). They are qualitatively
more in line with the NBS for selfish preferences (Hypothesis 1), which predicts a fall
in the proportion of agreements on the equal allocation as its total payoffs decrease,
although the data do not support the NBS’s prediction of a sharp fall (from 100% to
zero) in the proportion of equal agreements. Note also that overall most agreements
remain on the equal contract in games 1–4, hence quantitatively the KSS explains
a greater proportion of the data than the NBS with selfish preferences. The data
are however consistent with there being a distribution of different preferences in the
population, regardless of which bargaining solution is assumed (Hypothesis 3).
5.2. Changes in the Earnings of the Favored Player in the Unequal Contract(s)
Comparing games 7, 4, 8 shows that when the unequal contracts offer more to one
player and the same to the other (i.e., we increase y in the contracts (40, y) and (y, 40)),
a significantly smaller proportion of bargaining pairs agree on an equal contract, and
a significantly larger proportion agree on an unequal contract (Page’s trend test, p <
0.05).36
FINDING 3 (Hypotheses 4–6). Consider the two-sided games with an equal and
efficient contract (50,50) and unequal contracts of the form (40, y) and (y, 40), where
y D 70, 120, 240 (games 7, 4, 8). When y increases, significantly fewer subjects agree
on an equal and efficient contract, and significantly more agree on an unequal contract.
These findings are inconsistent with both bargaining theories under the assumption
that bargainers are selfish (cf. Hypotheses 4 and 5). They are, however, consistent with
there being a distribution of bargainers with different preferences in the population.
We can interpret Finding 3 as follows. When we go from games 7 to 4, and from
4 to 8, three things happen: first, each unequal contract offers a higher reward to one
of the players; second, the total earnings in the unequal contracts increase; third, the
unequal contracts become more unequal. We intuitively expect the first factor to lead
a self-interested subject to bargain harder in favor of his or her preferred unequal
contract; the second factor makes unequal contracts more attractive to subjects who, in
addition to their own, care about total earnings; the last factor, to the contrary, makes
the equal contract more attractive to subjects who dislike inequality. The data suggest
that in the population as a whole the first and second effects dominate the third.
We may also ask what sort of preference distribution fits our data best for each
of the theories. Since the KSS predicts the equal allocation for any combination
35. Our data thus fail to lend support to the “principle” stated in Herreiner and Puppe (2010), p. 230:
“First, determine the most equal distribution of rewards. If this contract is Pareto optimal, then choose it.”
36. Game 7 > game 4 D game 8 for agreement on equality (pairwise comparisons based on a Wilcoxon
signed-rank test). For agreements on inequality, the inequalities go in the opposite direction.
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of selfish and inequity averse preferences in games 1–4 and 7–8, any agreements
on an unequal allocation would require the presence of at least one bargainer with
social welfare preferences. We observe agreement rates on inequality as high as 50%
(game 8). A requirement that 50% of pairs contain one player with social welfare
preferences translates into a proportion of social welfare preferences in the population
of approximately 29%. This is just a lower bound, since some of the players who
agreed to the equal contract may also have social welfare preferences. Conversely, for
the NBS, selfish players would always agree to an unequal allocation, thus the 71%
frequency of agreements on the equal allocation in game 7 would be due to at least
one bargainer being inequity averse (or, more implausibly, to both bargainers having
social welfare preferences with high values of i and low values of  i). A requirement
that 71% of pairs contain at least one inequity averse player would translate into at
least 46% of bargainers being inequity averse.37
5.3. Monetarily Inefficient Contracts
Consider next the two-sided games with a monetarily inefficient equal contract; these
are games 5–6 and 9–11. From Table 2 we see that in none of these games does the
percentage of agreements on the equal allocation exceed 10%. As we saw, in games
1–4 , the frequency of the equal contract drops only gradually as its total payouts
decrease. However, as soon as the equal contract becomes inefficient (games 5–6), the
proportion of agreements on the equal contract drops dramatically.
FINDING 4 (Hypothesis 7). When the equal-earnings contract is monetarily inefficient,
it is agreed on very rarely.38
These findings provide support for Hypothesis 7. Note also that when the equal
contract is only weakly monetarily dominated (game 5), it remains as infrequently
agreed on as when it is strictly monetarily dominated (games 6, 9–11).
5.4. IIA versus Compromise
Recall that we interpret IIA as predicting that the rate of agreement on an equal contract
in a one-sided game is at least as large as in the corresponding two-sided game. Table 2
and Figure 3 show, however, that this is not what we typically observe. In almost all
the two-sided games the proportion of agreements on equality is larger than in the
corresponding one-sided games, violating IIA.39
37. Relatively mild levels of inequity aversion would be sufficient to explain the data. Both bargainers
having ˛i  ˇ i  0.1 would be sufficient for the equal allocation to be predicted by the NBS in game 7.
38. Sign tests, p > 0.1 for all comparisons between the sample mean and 0.
39. One-to-one comparisons between a two-sided game and the corresponding one-sided game show that
the average rate of agreement on the equal contract is significantly larger in game 6 than 17 (p D 0.085),
7 than 18 (p D 0.049), and 11 than 22 (p D 0.048).
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FINDING 5 (Hypothesis 8) The average rate of agreement on the equal contract
is significantly higher in two-sided than in one-sided games (p D 0.05), violating
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives.
These findings reject Hypothesis 8 in favor of a compromise effect. An equal-
earnings outcome not only gets some focality from its unique and absolute property of
offering equality of earnings (a property that holds regardless of which other contracts
are available), but also because it serves as a compromise between more extreme
contracts. This context-dependent property is relevant in two-sided but, by design, not
in one-sided games, and in our data it is strong enough to violate IIA.
The systematic deviations from IIA we observe allow us to reject the NBS under
very weak assumptions on preferences (not just any combination of selfish, inequity
averse and social welfare preferences, but any preferences where the utility of a contract
x depends only on x itself and not on what other contracts are available).
5.5. A Payoff Based Metric
In this section we consider if it is possible to construct a simple payoff-based measure
that can capture the main observed differences between the bargaining games.40
Consider a game with two contracts, one equal and another unequal. Denote these
by f(y, w), (z, z)g, where y > w and y C w  2z (i.e., the unequal allocation always
maximizes total payoffs). The equal allocation may or may not be Pareto efficient,
depending on whether z > w.
Suppose first that the equal allocation is efficient, that is, z > w. We define the
Gain Sacrifice Ratio, GRS, as the ratio between the gain in payoffs by one player and
the loss in payoffs for the other player, if they agree to the unequal allocation instead
of the equal one (GSR D .y  z/=.z  w/). Since the unequal allocation maximizes
total payoffs, this ratio is always at least 1. The larger GSR is, the more one of the
players gains, relative to the other’s loss when they agree to the unequal allocation
instead of the equal one–the trade-off between equality and efficiency becomes starker.
The GSR ratio can also be computed when the equal allocation is strongly
inefficient, that is, z < w (we discard the knife-edge case z D w). In this case
the ratio is negative, but a larger absolute value can be viewed as a more severe
equality-efficiency trade-off. For example, in game f(50,50), (240,60)g, GSR would be
.240  50/=.50  60/ D 19: agreeing to the unequal allocation makes both players
better-off (hence the “sacrifice” is negative) but the payoff increase of one of the players
is nineteen times greater than that of the other.41
40. We thank a referee for drawing our attention to this issue.
41. Interestingly, there is a link between the GSR and the utility functions discussed earlier. A positive
GSR is related to the value of  that would make a player with social welfare preferences indifferent
between the equal contract and the disadvantageously unequal contract. The utilities would be u(w, y) D
(1  )w C y and u(z, z) D z respectively. If they are equal, we obtain (1  )w C y D z, which
can be rewritten as .1  /= D .y  z/=.z  w/, which is the GSR. The larger the GSR, the lower the
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(a) Rate of agreement on equality (b) Rate of agreement on inequality
(c) Rate of disagreements
FIGURE 4. Gain-sacrifice ratio and bargaining outcomes.
For two-sided games of the form f(y, w), (z, z), (w, y)g, one can define the gain-
sacrifice ratio in exactly the same way. It now measures how much one of the players
can gain relative to the other’s loss if they agree to one of the unequal contracts instead
of the equal contract.42
Our games vary in the GSR, and Figure 4 shows how the bargaining outcomes
depend on this metric. For positive values of the GSR (equal contract is Pareto
efficient) we see a clear (nonlinear) relationship between the GSR and bargaining
outcomes. When GSR increases, (i) the proportion of agreements on an unequal
allocation increases, (ii) that on the equal allocation decreases, and (iii) the proportion
of disagreements increases.
The situation is very different for negative values of the GSR (i.e., when the equal
contract is Pareto inefficient). For two-sided games, we observe that an increase in the
threshold value of  and consequently the less concern for the other’s payoffs we need to assume in order
for a player to prefer the disadvantageously unequal contract. On the other hand, if the GSR is negative,
the relationship is with the value of ˛ in the Fehr–Schmidt utility function. Suppose a player is indifferent
between the equal allocation and the disadvantageously unequal allocation where both players get more.
Then u(w, y) D w  ˛(y  w) D z D u(z, z). This can be rewritten as .1 C ˛/=˛ D .y  z/=.z  w/,
where the right-hand side is the absolute value of the GSR. The larger the GSR in absolute value, the
less concern for inequity one needs to assume in order for an inequity averse player to prefer the equal
allocation.
42. We are implicitly assuming that the equal contract acts as a reference point from which gains and
losses are calculated.
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absolute value of the GSR results in a lower frequency of agreements on inequality
and a greater frequency of disagreements. In contrast, GSR has very little explanatory
power of disagreements in one-sided games. We provide a statistical analysis of all
these patterns in the Online Appendix.
We also consider an alternative metric, the total payoff efficiency ratio, TPER D
.y C w/=2z, the ratio between total earnings in the unequal and the equal contract,
and find that overall the GSR perform better. See the Online Appendix for details.
5.6. Analysis of Chat Conversations
We analyzed the content of conversations using the same method as Brandts and
Cooper (2007) and Cooper and Ku¨hn (2014). Two assistants separately coded the
conversations by ticking categories out of a list. Coding was binary for each category,
with a conversation coded as a 1 if it contained the category and zero otherwise.
The categories are not mutually exclusive, and coders could tick as many or as few
categories as they wished.
5.6.1. Chat Categories. In what follows, is a list of the categories that were most
common in our data; the entire list is in the Online Appendix.
Fairness/equality. One or both subjects refer to fairness or equality.
Rock-paper-scissors (RPS). The contract agreed upon is determined by the outcome
of a game of RPS.43
Standoff. Each of the two subjects proposes, either by chat or by clicking, the unequal
contract that favors them. By definition, this is only possible in two-sided games.
Standoff-equal. One of the two subjects proposes, either by chat or by clicking, the
unequal contract that favors them, and the other subject proposes the equal contract.
Generous proposal. One subject takes the initiative in proposing, either by chat or
clicking, the contract that favors the other subject. We asked the coders to tick this
category only if the subject proposed this contract from the outset, and the other subject
had not previously proposed the same contract, by chat or clicking.
Both better-off. One or both subjects refer to some contract(s) as being better for both
subjects compared to other contracts.
Cost-benefit. One or both subjects refer to the costs and benefits of agreeing on one
rather than another contract (e.g., “I gain more than you lose”, “this will not cost you
much”, or similar).
Be generous. A subject appeals to the other’s generosity.
43. This was typically achieved by both subjects agreeing to type one of the three words or letters (R,
S, P) when the timer on their screens reached a particular value (e.g., when there were 90 s left) in order
to achieve simultaneity of moves. The subjects then agreed on the contract preferred by the winner of the
RPS game.
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Off topic. One or both subjects write messages that are not directly related to the
experiment, for example, cracking jokes, talking about the weather, music, football,
and so forth.
Supergame. This is a composite category where we pool several individual categories
that might be related to supergame reasoning. This includes any references to past or
to future scenarios, such as general rules of behavior for all scenarios, claims of having
been unlucky or generous in past scenarios, and references to karma.
As in Brandts and Cooper (2007) and Cooper and Ku¨hn (2014), we use the
average of the coders’ output. For example, one of the coders found references to
fairness/equality in 15.5% of all games and the other in 17.6% of all games; hence on
average they found references to fairness in 16.5% of all games, and this is the value
we use. 44 The Cohen’s kappa coefficient of agreement (Cohen 1960) between the two
coders is high, particularly for the categories that were more common in the data (see
bottom of Table 3 and the Online Appendix).
5.6.2. Analysis. Table 3 summarizes the results of the coding, focusing on categories
that were assigned to at least 5% of the bargaining situations by the coders (in particular,
the table reports the percentage frequencies of the chat categories for every game and
possible bargaining outcome).45 The full data set can be found in the Online Appendix.
In the remaining of this section we focus on the five most prominent categories—
RPS, fairness/equality, standoff, standoff-equal and generous proposal—and the
hybrid category supergame. For each of these categories, we investigate (i) in which
games it is observed, and (ii) what it accomplishes in terms of bargaining outcome. To
answer the first question, we ran, for each category, an ordered logistic regression over
all bargaining games. The dependent variable is whether a category is assigned to a
given game by neither, only one or both coders. Independent variables include a dummy
for each of the 22 games, and the round in which the game occurred. The results are
reported in the Online Appendix. In what follows, when we compare the frequency of
each category across games, the p values are based on pairwise comparisons between
the coefficients of these regressions.
To answer the second question, we simply rely on descriptive statistics (this
is because we cannot treat the different categories of chat conversation as being
independent). In particular, we compare the proportion of disagreements, agreements
on equality, and agreements on inequality respectively across the different chat
categories. These proportions are reported at the bottom of Table 3.
44. These percentages are calculated over all games, not just over games where there was a chat. It is
possible for three of our categories to be ticked even though there was no chat (standoff, standoff-equal
and generous proposal).
45. There are only five categories that occur in more than 10% of the games: RPS, fairness/equality,
standoff, standoff-equal and generous proposal. There are also four categories with frequencies between
5% and 10%: both better off, cost-benefit, be generous and off topic. The composite supergame category
appears in 6.2% of the games.
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Rock-paper-scissors. RPS is much more common in two-sided than in one-sided
games (25% of all two-sided games were coded as RPS, compared with only 1.9%
of one-sided games; p < 0.001). This suggests that although bargainers find it salient
to use RPS as a mechanism to decide between two unequal allocations (reconciling
total-earnings efficiency with ex ante equality), they do not find it attractive to use
as a general mechanism to resolve conflict over two contracts. For example, in the
(one-sided) game 14, 30% of games were coded as a standoff between the equal
and the unequal allocation. None of the pairs used RPS to resolve the standoff
situation.
If we focus on how the frequency of RPS varies across two-sided games, we
see that its frequency increases in games 1–6 as the equal allocation becomes less
attractive (game 1 D game 2 D game 3 < game 4 D game 5 D game 6, p < 0.01)—
this is consistent with subjects looking for alternative agreements and using RPS as
a means to choose between the two unequal allocations. Similarly, the frequency of
RPS increases when we compare games 7, 4, and 8 (game 7 < game 4 D game 8,
p < 0.05),46 and when we compare 9, 10 and 11, although for the last three games
the differences are not significant. This is consistent with our previous finding that
subjects agreed on inequality more often when the unequal allocations offer greater
total payoffs, even though the allocations are more unequal.
It is also worth noting that, even if RPS is often associated with agreements on
inequality (22.5% of these agreements are linked to RPS), not all agreements on
inequality are the result of using RPS. As we have seen, agreements on inequality are
more common in one-sided games, where RPS is almost never used. Even in two-sided
games, only about half (46.72%) of unequal agreements are the result of using RPS.
FINDING 6. The frequency of RPS differs, often significantly, across games. Within
two-sided games, RPS is more often used in games where the unequal contracts offer
greater total payoffs relative to the equal contract. In contrast, RPS is almost never
used in one-sided games.
Fairness. A comparison of two-sided with one-sided games shows that
fairness/equality references tend to be more common in two-sided games (p D
0.004); this is consistent with the greater frequency of equal agreements in two-sided
games.
Focusing on one-sided games, fairness is mentioned between 15% and 25% of
the time when the equal allocation is efficient (games 12–15, 18, and 19), but the
frequency is much lower (between 4% and 9%) in games 16, 17, 20–22, where the
equal allocation is inefficient. This suggests that most of our subjects are not strongly
inequity averse, since they are not preoccupied with equality of earnings when there
is only one unequal allocation available and this unequal allocation offers greater
earnings to both subjects. References to fairness also tend to be more often associated
46. As we mentioned earlier, statistical tests are computed based on pairwise comparisons between the
coefficients of an ordered logistic regression.
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with agreement on equality (fairness is discussed in 25.2% of the interactions that
ended in an agreement on equality).
FINDING 7. References to fairness are more common in two-sided games. Within
one-sided games, references to fairness are more common when the equal allocation
is efficient. No such pattern exists for two-sided games.
Standoffs. Standoffs tend to become more common as the degree of conflict of
interest between the two bargainers increases. The comparison across games of the
frequency of standoffs follows the same pattern as the comparison of disagreement
rates.
It is worth noting that standoff-equal is more frequent than standoff in some two-
sided games where the total earnings of the equal contract are similar to those of
the unequal contract (game 1, where the equal contract is total-earnings efficient, and
games 2 and 7). This is consistent with the equal contract losing its focality only
gradually as its total earnings decrease.
Finally, (both symmetric and asymmetric) standoffs in general tends to be linked to
disagreement (44% of the chat conversations that ended in disagreement were classified
as Standoff, and 27.5% as Standoff-Equal).
Generous Proposals. Generous proposals are more common in one-sided games
(p < 0.001). Of course, a generous proposal in games 17 and 20–22 is also a self-
interested proposal, since the unequal allocation offers more to both subjects. Most of
the generous proposals occurred in those games or in game 16, where the equal and
the unequal allocation give the same payoff to the proposer.
Generous proposals are important for agreements on inequality, particularly in
one-sided games, where 30.34% of agreements on inequality follow this category of
conversation.
Even though generous proposals are less frequent in two-sided games, they still
account for 13.6% of agreements on inequality. If we add the frequency of agreement
on inequality following a generous proposal to those following RPS (there is only
one situation that has been coded as both by one coder) we find that around 60%
of agreements on inequality follow a generous proposal or a game of RPS. Hence,
“tough” protracted bargaining is relatively uncommon in our data.
Supergame. This category appears more frequently in games with a lot of conflict
of interest between the players (games 4, 5, 8, 11, and 15). It is disproportionately
common in games that ended in disagreement (in 18.8% of the cases), suggesting that
communication related to supergame reasoning was not a good strategy on average.
6. Conclusion
People often need to bargain in order to reach a joint decision, but it may not be
possible to find an agreement that is both equal and total-earnings maximizing, or even
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efficient. In such situations, how do bargainers trade-off these properties? Do they tend
to settle on an equal and efficient (or perhaps even inefficient) contract, or rather on an
unequal and total earnings maximizing contract?
We report on the findings from experiments where subjects are free to make
proposals, can communicate, and sign binding agreements, and we vary the severity
of the trade-off between efficiency and equality, in order to understand how the typical
focal agreement varies with the efficiency-equality trade-off.
The data show that an inefficient contract is almost never agreed on. Second,
equality and efficiency together ensure strong focality only if the total earnings are also
sufficiently high; otherwise many bargainers settle on an unequal and total-earnings
maximizing contract. Moreover, the data indicate that the bargainers are more occupied
with maximizing their own monetary payoff, and possibly to some extent that of their
counterpart, and less with ensuring equality of money earnings.47 Finally, the data
reveal that equality of earnings gets its focality from two sources, namely its absolute
property of offering equal earnings, and from being a compromise between unequal
contracts over which there is a conflict of interest. The second of these properties
results in a systematic failure of the IIA axiom.
Our results also have implications for bargaining theory. We reject the assumption
of selfish preferences, regardless of the bargaining solution (Nash or Kalai-
Smorodinsky). Once we allow for preference heterogeneity, there is considerable
agreement between the theories as to the direction of the comparative static predictions,
and our data are broadly in line with those. Nevertheless, even if we allow for
heterogeneity, the violation of IIA indicates that there are systematic deviations from
the predictions of the Nash Bargaining Solution even under very weak assumptions
about preferences.
Our laboratory setting allowed us to study, in a controlled and systematic way, how
bargainers trade off equality, efficiency, and total-earnings maximization. A potential
drawback (shared with many other lab experiments) is a lack of external validity (for
a recent debate see Fre´chette and Schotter 2015). Future studies can test whether
our results hold with nonstudent populations—especially those more familiar with
negotiations (e.g., business men, salespeople, union negotiators)—, they can increase
the stakes of the experiment, or consider bargaining environments with more contracts,
where the assessment of the efficiency-equality trade-off might be more demanding.
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